China's economic amelioration is one of the most needful events in recent times. It is at least partially the consequence of her group and political evolution/revolution in the past century. If the west wants to understand contemporary China, it is needful not to misunderstand her founder, Mao. However, the book of J. Chang (Jc) and J. Haliday, Mao, the unknown story, is misleading the Western group into profound misunderstanding of Mao, China's contemporary history and China itself.
The central theme of the book is to condemn Mao as an evil monster, "as bad as or worse than Hitler". The western media immediately appropriate this claim. When the book was first published in Uk in June 2005, it was hailed by all major media with great enthusiasm, tantalizing many well known China experts from polity (e.g., C. Pattern, the last British governor of Hong Kong), journalism (e.g., J. Mirsky, the Time's East Asia editor) and academia (e.g., M. Yahuda, the ex-chairman of the department of International Relation, London School of Economics). Agreeing to these experts, everyone with a cheap mind should be totally convinced by the book beyond any doubt. On this issue there is a rare harmony in which the voice of the Guardian is indistinguishable from that of the Daily Mail. Within one week, the book jumped to the top position of the non-fiction best selling list. Jung Chang has become the authority on the Chinese history. A person, who asked tantalizing questions during one of her seminars, was deemed by others as "an confident Maoist" and could not stop his questions. Some western readers condemned a less complementary comment about the book on the Amazon web site as "ugly Chinese propaganda".
Stamp Story
The supporters have such unlimited reliance partially because the book is supposedly the outcome of 10 years of intensive research, based on private archives and hundreds of interviews in many countries. Unfortunately, a particular reader can see clearly that there are huge gaps between its sensational claims and vast references. Moreover, the evidence in the book often contradicts, rather than supports, the claims. This divulge will point out these contradictions and inconsistencies which may have escaped most readers' eyes and been ignored by the Western media.
To divulge the allembracing potential of the book, we take on its 17 major claims, which are evenly distributed over Mao's life. Instead of picking up its weaknesses or minor points, we focus on those issues, which tarnish Mao's character most and are praised most extremely in the Western media as solidly proven. These issues are dealt within 17 sections:
1. The Purge in the Ruijin Base,
2. Chiang Let the Reds Go (I)
3. Chiang Let the Reds Go (Ii)
4. The Fake Battle at the Luding Bridge,
5. Mao Carried through the Long March,
6. Mao Did Not Fight Japanese,
7. The Trap for the New 4th Army,
8. Mao Sacrificed His Brother Tse-min,
9. The Rectification Campaign,
10. Opium Sale,
11. 3 Million Deaths in 1950-51,
12. 27 Million Deaths in Jails/Labor Camps,
13. The Superpower Program,
14. 38 Million Deaths in 1958-61,
15. 3 Million Deaths in 1966-76,
16. Mao's Aim of the Cultural Revolution,
17. Mao Compared with Hitler.
This divulge has been sent to many Western media outlets since early August 2005, but received no response. However, it is not the only negative divulge on Jc's book. Four months after its first publication, needful voices began to emerge from exterior of Europe. For instance, in an article in the New York Review, J. Spence of Yale University singles out two false stories in the book. In the New York Times, a former correspondent in Beijing N. Kristof reveals that one of alleged interviewees listed in the book, Zhang Hanzhi denies that she had ever been interviewed by the authors. An Australian H. McDonald reveals in The Age that a recent visit by reporters to Luding Bridge confirms the battle 70 years ago, which Jc claims to be a perfect invention. He quoted from T. Bernstein of Columbia University that "the book is a major disaster for the contemporary China field". Also, "Princeton's Perry Link have felt compelled to criticise" Jc's "factual errors and dubious use of sources". Moreover, "many scholars point out that much of what Chang and Halliday present as a previously 'unknown story' has in fact been exposed long ago. . . . But no reputation is given to these earlier writers". In London divulge of Books, A. Nathan of Columbia University provides plentifulness of evidence showing that "Chang and Halliday are magpies: every tantalizing piece of evidence goes in, no matter where it comes from or how trustworthy it is".
This divulge differs from those of Western academics in two aspects. First, it shows the total fallacy of the book, instead of just a few inaccuracies. Secondly, it demonstrates the book's major flaws without mammoth references about Chinese history, by only using the data and references mainly arrival from the book itself. In so doing, the divulge raises a further question: why did most media and experts in the Uk fail to see these confident inconsistencies and contradictions in the book? If it cannot be excused by the ignorance of Chinese history?
Although this divulge met absolute silence in the west, it has drawn some attention from overseas Chinese. One of the web sites, which published this review, Duowei, interviewed Jung Chang in New York in October 2005, and asked her my questions (see the article at: [http://blog.chinesenewsnet.com/?p=3467], or the whole interview video at: [http://www.berm.co.nz/cgi-bin/video/play.cgi?lz1JaUtTdSm]). This is what Jung Chang said about this review: "I have read it, and read carefully. Some questions are quite good. I do hope to have opportunities to talk them. I think it is very important. However, there are many issues, I do not know either he did not understand English, or did not look at the references in case,granted at the back of the book. There are many details, the origins of the figures, all in the back of the book. Among 800 pages, there are 150 pages of references, the sources of the references. One has to read those sources from the references. I think he either did not understand English, or did not read references carefully. I have looked at his questions, and can give easy answers to all of them".
In the interview, Jung Chang de facto responded to three of my 17 questions, namely, (2), (3) and (4). A reader can look at the paragraphs marked by * signs below, in each of the three sections to appreciate her "easy answers".
After the appearance of this review, Jung Chang's brother, Pu Zhang (a translator for the Chinese version of the book), claims in October 2005 on the Duowei web site that, my Chinese translation seriously distorted Jc's words, and he would post the direct comparison of the traditional text and my translation on the web for readers to see the difference. However, despite readers repeatedly request him to keep his promises, his English-Chinese comparison has not be seen everywhere so far.
1. The Purge in the Ruijin Base
Jung Chang's first major accusation against Mao is that his purge in the Ruijin base, the first Red State in China, caused more than 350,000 deaths, or 10% of the total population. Her figure is grossly exaggerated because she assumes the reduction of 0.7 million in Ruijin's citizen was the succeed of citizen either being killed in battles or dying of persecution under Mao. She ignores civilian deaths and emigration completely.
From 1931-35, "the citizen of Red Jiangxi fell by more than half a million . . . The fall in Red Fujian was comparable. . . . . Altogether some 700,000 citizen died in the Ruijin base" (p. 113). Jc apparently deduces this figure from the citizen ratio of Red Jiangxi to that of Red Fujian. But from her "half a million" citizen reduction in Jiangxi, we should get Ruijin's 700,000 citizen reduction, not deaths.
Then, as "238,844 citizen in Jiangxi were counted as 'revolutionary martyrs', i.e., citizen who had been killed in wars and intra-party purges" (p. 114 fn), Jc uses the citizen ratio again to get the total amount of martyrs in the whole of Ruijin, which is 238,884×700,000/500,000 = 334,438. The rest of the reduction in population, 700,000 - 334,438 = 365,562, i.e., "More than half", she concludes, "were murdered as 'class enemies', or were worked to death, or committed suicide, or died other premature deaths attributable to the regime" (pp. 113-114).
This calculation is not professional. First, it ignores civilian deaths caused by the war, through killing, illness, economic hardship and starvation etc, which often list for a larger part of the loss of life in long continuing wars. during that duration Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek launched five "annihilation expeditions" against Ruijin, one of which complicated "half a million troops" (p. 125). At one time the Ruijin base "had been reduced to a mere some dozen quadrate kilometers" (p. 103) from "50,000 sq. Km" (p.104). Chiang's army had busy most of the area of the base.
Many citizen cooperated with the communists, even "children were used as sentries, and formed into harassment squads, called 'humiliation teams' to hound citizen into joining the army" (p. 110). Chiang's army was not known for treating civilians with mercy. Even before the Red state came into existence, "tens of thousands of Communists and suspects were slaughtered" during Chiang's campaign in 1927 (p. 47). Given all these factors, civilian deaths must have been significant.
Secondly, Jung Chang's calculation ignores emigration out of the Ruijin area, which should be foreseen, after five annihilation expeditions in five years. Especially, we are told that Mao's course in the Red base 'was to confiscate every last single thing' (p. 111), and "China's first Red state was run by terror and guarded like a prison." (p. 113). In that case, citizen should have escaped from Mao's hell when Chiang's army liberated them five times. So the amount of refugees must have been needful too.
If we assume that the sum of civilian deaths and refugees together is almost the same as the amount of martyrs, there would be far fewer left who were "murdered as 'class enemies', or were worked to death, or committed suicide, or died other premature deaths attributable to the regime". The amount would be 700,000 - 334,438×2 = 31,124, less than 10% of Jung Chang's figure.
2. Chiang Let the Reds Go (I)
Jung Chang's second major discovery is to deny Mao's contribution to the Red Army's survival during the Long March. She argues that, it is Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who let the Red Army go because he wanted an excuse to send his own army into Guichou and Sichuan. She gives no evidence for this. Instead, by her own account, Chiang did not need to use Mao's army as his excuse because a strong Red Army had already been placed in Sichuan for nearly three years before Mao's arrival.
"There can be no doubt that Chiang let the Ccp leadership and the main force of the Red Army escape". "He wanted to drive the Red Army into these hold-out provinces, so that their warlords would be so frightened of the Reds settling in their territory that they would allow Chiang's army in to drive the Reds out" (p.137).
Jung Chang's reference does withhold the customary fact that Chiang thought about his entry into Sichuan as a useful by-product of his pursuit of the Red Army. But it does not imply Chiang let the Red Army escape. On the contrary, in the autumn of 1932, someone else Ccp leader Chang Kuo-tao had "moved to northern Sichuan, where he built a new and bigger base within a year, and vast his army to over 80,000. Kuo-tao was de facto the most successful of all the Communists" (pp. 147-148). At the time of Mao's arrival in Sichuan, Chang Kuo-tao's 80,000 soldiers "were well fed, well qualified with machine-guns and mortars and ample ammunition, and superbly trained" (p. 163). On the other hand, Mao's army "was down to some 10,000, . . . The surviving remnant was on the verge of collapse" (p.163).
It seems odd that "the most successful" Chang Kuo-tao's army of 80,000, after having placed down there for three years, still could not frighten the Sichuan warlords, and Chiang had to use Mao's army which "was on the verge of collapse". Why? Without an explanation one de facto has reasons to "doubt that Chiang let the Ccp leadership and the main force of the Red Army escape".
* Facing this demand in her interview with Duowei, Jung Chang replied: "This is a good question. But we have studied it already. When Chang Ku-tao entered Sichuan, he was in the north; Chiang Kei-shek de facto wanted to follow. But Sichuan had a regional defense principles then, each region had its own warlord, not together, all divided. Chiang Kei-shek drove the Central Red Army from the south into Sichuan. He wanted to conquer the south, the west, the north, also conquer the warlord in the east."
Then, why did not Chiang Kai-shek drive Chang Kuo-tao from the north to the west, east and south, but had to drive the Central Red Army far away from Jiangxi? Jung Chang's talk immediately leads to almost the same demand again. It does not illustrate anything. Isn't it too easy to "give easy answers" just like this?
3. Chiang Let the Reds Go (Ii)
To deny Mao's contribution in the Long March, Jc offers someone else principles to illustrate why Chiang let the Red Army go: he did it to get his son back from Russia. Jung Chang's evidence only shows that Chiang wanted his son back, but does not show he let the Reds go. On the contrary, she shows that for his same popular son, Chiang was not even willing to release two unknown spies.
According to Jc, for Chiang Kai-shek's decision of "letting the Reds go, . . . There was another, more private and totally private reason. Chiang's son Chin-up had been a hostage in Russia" (p. 138). "Chiang had devised a thought about crafted swap: the survival of the Ccp for Ching-Kuo. It was not an offer that could be spelt out. He executed his plan in subtle ways" (p. 140).
It was so subtle that no article was left for Jc to prove that Chiang did it, or even intended to do so. The only evidence is that Chiang worried about his son and asked Moscow to let him back. No swap was mentioned anywhere, not even in Chiang's diary. But there was someone else swap that was spelt out. Agreeing to Jc, Chiang's "sister-in-law, Mme Sun Yat-sen (nee Soong Ching-ling), who was someone else Soviet agent", "speaking for Moscow", spelt out a proposal of "swapping Ching-kuo for two top Russian agents who had recently been arrested in Shanghai. Chiang turned the swap down" (pp. 139-140).
Since Chiang was unwilling to let two Russian agents go in exchange for his son's release, it is unlikely that he let the Red Army of tens of thousands armed men escape. If he did, one would wonder what kind of agents could be so important. Actually, the "two top Russian agents" are the Chinese concentrate Niu Lan and his wife. Jc does not even tell their names, though a dozen other Russian agents are named in her book. Why? Maybe Jc has some "more private and totally private reason".
* during her interview with Duowei, Jung Chang said: Chiang Kai-shek "wanted to trade the Reds' survival for his son's return. How did we get the references? There are many, many references. The first comes from the Russian Archive, how Chiang Kai-shek negotiated with the Russians. There are also many records in Chiang Kai-shek's diary. Chiang Ching-kuo had an own list of the event; it contains such data as well. Moreover, as how Chiang Kai-shek let the Red Army go, there are many historical materials about the Long March, the telegraphs between the Kuomintang armies. We have given detailed explanations for all of them in the book."
Of course I have read all of these detailed explanations. de facto because of this, I wrote: "Jung Chang's evidence only shows that Chiang wanted his son back, but does not show he let the Reds go". Jc just repeats what she wrote in the book, but still fails to show any evidence of how Chiang let the Reds go. Why didn't she naturally quote one sentence from her "many, many references", which indicates that Chiang let or wanted to let the Reds go? Isn't this an easier talk than to list many, many circumstantial references?
4. The Fake Battle at the Luding Bridge
Jung Chang's claim of the nonexistence of the battle at the Luding Bridge has been widely publicized in the west as a fatal blow to the Red Army legend. In the official account, the Ccp and Red Army were close to destruction near the Dadu River. If they had failed to obtain the Luding Bridge, they would have been eliminated. The Luding Bridge battle is famous for its historic significance, not the scale.
Instead of disproving existing accounts, Jc makes her claim mainly based on her interview with a 93-year-old woman. But, even Agreeing to that account, the Red Army did fire heavy weapons at the Bridge. Jc does not illustrate why. Given the Reds' miniature ammunitions, it was unlikely they would have wasted them with no enemy in sight.
According to Jc, the battle at the Luding Bridge "is perfect invention. There was no battle at the Dadu Bridge". "There were no Nationalist troops at the bridge when the Reds arrived" (p. 159). A 93-year-old woman lived there at the time. "She remembered the Communists firing as 'only Yin a shell, and Yang a shot' --- a Chinese expression for sporadic. She did not remember her side of the river being fired on at all" (p. 159).
Jc does not illustrate either her definition of "Nationalist troops" includes the troops of Sichuan warlords which did not belong to the Nationalist regular army. Her source of reference suggests it does not. If so, her proof is flawed, because Agreeing to the official story, it was exactly the warlord's army which defended the bridge.
On the other hand, Jc acknowledges that the Red Army "shelled and fired over the river at Luding on the opposite side" (p.159), and "there was a fire in the town itself, caused, most likely, by Red Army shelling" (p. 160). The Red Army could not have used their gunfire as fireworks because their ammunition was very scarce. Just a month later, without any serious battle, it had "lost all its heavy weapons, leaving it only with rifles, with an average of five bullets each" (p.163). Its heavy weapons would have been used only if de facto necessary. Jc does not illustrate why the Reds shelled at all.
The shelling was unlikely due to a reconnaissance failure either. As "the bridge was not reduced to bare chains" (p. 160), sending a man over could have been done in a few minutes, probably more quickly than setting up the firing position. If it were a reconnaissance failure, the invention of the battle must have been used to cover it up. In that case, Mao, as one of the top commanders, was the cheated, not the cheater.
The only possible explanation left for the shelling is that it was to fake a battle for propaganda purposes, as seemingly suggested by Jc. In this case, the Reds did not need to fire at all, unless they had a video camera then. Moreover, they would not have undertaken extra efforts which make it more likely that the sham would be exposed. But they held "a celebration immediately afterwards", presenting each of 22 fake heroes with "a Lenin suit, a fountain pen, a bowl and a pair of chopsticks" (p. 160). Then the myth could have been exposed de facto by any of these specifically identified fake heroes.
Furthermore, Jc does not illustrate why the Nationalists did not expose this lie for 70 years. Their propagandists, not knowing Chiang's plan to set the Reds free, should have no think to keep the sham as an "unknown story".
Finally, who could benefit from this lie? Agreeing to Jc, as Mao had just led the Red Army through a disastrous "2,000-kilometre detour" (p. 162), "a deep resentment grew towards Mao. . . . everyone was furious with Mao" (p. 155). If Mao could have let the Red Army cross the Dadu River without firing a bullet, his image as a troops genius and his popularity would have shot up the most. A fabricated battle could only have reduced his reputation, not enhanced it. Whoever made up the battle story was more likely Mao's enemy, not his friends or himself.
* In her interview with Duowei, she answered my demand this way: "Many of his arguments are because he did not read our references, even not our texts". She said that her main evidence is not from the 93 years-old lady, "the main references are written documents, one of them shows that the 22 Red Army soldiers crossed the bridge first, these 22 men did not suffer any injury, and held a ceremony after crossing. Each of them got a bowl and a pair of chopsticks, and a pen. . . . He did not read our references, not even the text, but made comments, I do not know why. We also conducted a lot of explore on which Kuomintang army defended the bridge, and illustrate in details in the book. We find that this army was moved away from here before the Red Army arrived. There was a telegraph from that time. Our references consist of the origin of the telegraph. He does not mention this at all, it is not reasonable. Answering such questions would waste too much time".
Sorry, it is exactly having read her text and reference sources, I could maybe write: "Jc does not illustrate either her definition of 'Nationalist troops' includes the troops of Sichuan warlords which did not belong to the Nationalist regular army. Her source of reference suggests it does not. If so, her proof is flawed, because Agreeing to the official story, it was exactly the warlord's army which defended the bridge". From Jung Chang's reply, we still cannot see "whether her definition of "Nationalist troops" includes the troops of Sichuan warlords". Apparently, she does not want to waste her time to read a few words of my question, just "give easy answers". But she said not only she had read my review, but also "read carefully". "I do not know why".
Jc emphasizes that her major evidence that no battle existed is no death. I de facto did "not mention this at all", because it is naturally not an evidence. Even if "these 22 men did not suffer any injury", we can only doubt the intensity of the battle, but cannot rule out the possibility of its occurrence. The warlord army which defended the bridge was called "double gunners", one rifle and one opium gun, lack of basic training and experience. The mere fact of no Red Army death cannot prove that the battle "is perfect invention".
5. Mao Carried through the Long March
Jung Chang's other sensational allegation is that Mao was carried by a litter throughout the Long March. But none of her references suggests that Mao was carried regularly. The closest "evidence" is a statement by Mao himself which was published in one of the most authoritative and tightly controlled Chinese official presses.
According to Jc, from the start of the Long March, Mao, Lo Fu and Wang Jia-xiang formed a trio. "The trio traveled together, ordinarily reclining on litters. . . For much of the Long March, along with the most grueling part of the trek, most of them were carried." (p. 144)
Very oddly, for such a sensational accusation, Jc does not supply any reference to withhold this single sentence. some questions arise. The first demand is either the trio of Mao had the power to obtain such a privilege. "Lo Fu, the only member of the trio who was in the Secretariat" (p. 145), said "I felt I was put in a position completely without power" (p. 144). It was even worse for Mao, who "was isolated and miserable" (p. 132). Before the Long March he was worried that he might be abandoned, and went everywhere he thought the Red Army might go, hoping to be picked up mercifully as he stood on the side of the road (p. 128). With such a position, Mao's litter was less likely for his comfort, but due to the fact that "days before the planned departure, his climatic characteristic shot up to 41°C and he grew delirious with malaria" (p. 132).
Another demand is Mao's desire to be carried. As the trio of Mao was plotting a coup in the Red Army (pp. 144-6), they should have been keen to boost their popularity. "Aversion to privilege was particularly strong in the army because many had originally been attracted to join by the lure of equality, which was the Party's main appeal" (p. 77). It is unlikely that the trio of Mao could grab the leadership while lying in litters. Why didn't the opponents complain about this? This would be possible only if they were also carried. But then it would be unthinkable that the Red Army could stick together and feel the hardship, e.g. In the swampland as Jc describes (pp. 167 - 169).
Jung Chang's other evidence is the existence of a "charge --- Mao and the other leaders had 'sat in sedan chairs' all through the March" (p. 165). The only quoted part of this fee is 'sat in sedan chairs', without a subject. This reference comes from Mao's arch rival Chang Kuo-tao, writing long after he defected from the Red Army to the Nationalists. Chang and Mao met in late June 1935 and departed in early August (p. 166). As indicated on the map of the book, they shared a coarse path only from Fubian to Maoergai, a minor fraction of the March. Chang's fee of Mao sitting "'in sedan chairs' all through the March", even if true, had to come from others' testimony. Whose testimony? Neither Chang Kuo-tao nor Jc gives any clue.
The closest "evidence" of Mao being carried ordinarily is: "Mao himself told his staff decades later: 'On the March, I was lying in a litter. So what did I do? I read. I read a lot.'" (p. 144). Mao's words do not necessarily imply he was carried regularly. Let's see how cheap Jung Chang's interpretation is. Mao's words appear in his personal secretary Ye Zilong's memoirs, published by The Press of the Central Archive (2000). It is one of the most authoritative and tightly controlled government presses. Jc accuses the Chinese government of exterior Mao's secrets. But a crucial part of her story comes from an official press. Even if Mao's loyalist Ye betrayed him, and the government was ahead of Jc in denouncing Mao, it is hard to believe that such an accusation, Agreeing to Jung Chang's interpretation, generates no awareness in China and remains an "unknown story".
6. Mao Did Not Fight Japanese
To discredit Mao among the Chinese, Jc claims that Mao had no interest in fighting Japan, but only in beginning a civil war against Chiang Kai-shek. But, her evidence shows that Mao's strategy was the only feasible way for the Reds to fight Japanese effectively.
In a part entitled: "Fight Rivals and Chiang --- Not Japan" (p.218), Jc writes: "Mao had no strategy to drive the Japanese out of China" (p. 211). "He bombarded his troops commanders with telegrams such as 'Focus on creating base areas . . . . Not on fighting battles' . . . All the time, Mao was urging them to stop fighting the Japanese and concentrate on taking over territory" (pp. 212-213).
What if the Reds had followed an opposite strategy, i.e., fighting the Japanese head on? In August 1937 a war between the Japanese and Chiang's armies broke out. "In Shanghai, 73 of China's 180 divisions --- and the best one-third --- over 400,000 men, were thrown in, and all but wiped out. . . . The Japanese suffered much fewer, though still heavy, casualties: about 40,000" (p. 209).
"At this time, the Chinese Red Army had some 60,000 regular troops" (p. 211). Let's assume they were just as efficient as the best part of Chiang's troops, although their equipment, supply and training were much inferior. Then, if they had fought the Japanese head on, they could hardly have inflicted on the Japanese more than 6,000 casualties before they were "all but wiped out". That is less than one sixth of what Chiang achieved in Shanghai, de facto insufficient to defeat Japan. If Japan had secured its rear, Chiang's force would most likely have not resisted much longer.
Fortunately, the Reds followed Mao's strategy. The result: "By mid-November (1937), the first new Communist base in the Japanese rear was formed, near Peking, called Jinchaji, with a citizen of some 12 million" (p. 213). "By January 1940, the 8Ra, under Zhu De and Peng, had grown to at least 240,000 (from 46,000 at the beginning of the war). And the N4A, operating under Liu Shao-chi near Shanghai and Nanking, had tripled, to 30,000. A score of sizeable bases sprang up in the Japanese rear. The base of Jinchaji alone, only some 80 km from Peking, vast to control a citizen of 25 million" (p. 225). This evidence suggests Mao de facto had a "strategy to drive the Japanese out of China".
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